Abstract-The paper considers the problem of detecting cyber-attacks occurring in communication networks typically used in the secondary control layer of DC microgrids. The proposed distributed methodology allows for scalable monitoring of a microgrid and is able to detect the presence of data injection attacks in the communications among Distributed Generation Units (DGUs) -governed by consensus-based control -and isolate the communication link over which the attack is injected. Each local attack detector requires limited knowledge regarding the dynamics of its neighbors. Detectability properties of the method are analyzed, as well as a class of undetectable attacks. Some results from numerical simulation are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
information flowing through communication channels is vulnerable to malicious attacks and can be compromised [9] , [10] , [11] . These attacks are aimed at hindering normal microgrid operation and can have detrimental consequences like voltage instability, damage of critical loads, blackouts, etc [12] . Therefore, detection and isolation of attacks are necessary in order to undertake remedial actions.
The field of attack detection and isolation, which plays a central role in secure control systems, has attracted growing interest in recent years [13] , [14] . This is due to the fact that an ever growing number of control systems are integrating communication tools to regulate the processes. This in turn has exposed them to attacks. Some approaches in security of cyber-physical systems stem from prior research in the field of fault detection and isolation (FDI), a well established area of research which focuses on identifying if the behaviour of the underlying process is healthy or whether it is subject to a fault. The available literature on attack detection and isolation, differently to that on cyber-security in the computer science sense, attempts to exploit knowledge of the system dynamics in order to verify whether communicated information is corrupted or not [15] . Most work in the secure control literature is based on centralized architectures [9] , which in many cases may not be appropriate given the complexity of most cyber-physical systems. Hence, it is necessary to develop distributed methodologies. In the literature, few works, e.g. [10] , [16] , [17] point in this direction. In [10] , [16] the authors develop a distributed methodology to detect attacks on the physical processes of subsystems, but it is assumed that the communication between detectors is secure. Furthermore, for design of the method in [17] knowledge of the model of the entire system is required. On the other hand, in the literature several contributions proposing distributed FDI techniques have been presented [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] . In this work, we propose an attack detection and isolation methodology which is able to identify attacks present in the communication network supporting a consensus-based secondary control for current sharing in DCmGs. A novel estimator has been developed, based on Unknown Input Observers (UIOs) [24] . The proposed estimator is able to identify, with limited information of the overall DCmG's model, whether output measurements received from its neighbors are corrupted by a data-injection attack or not. Preliminary results have been presented in [25] . With respect to [25] , local UIOs are exploited to estimate the state of neighboring DGUs. Detection thresholds are developed which ensure the absence of false alarms. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first work designing an attack detection architecture for DC microgrids.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II the models of the DC microgrid and of the attack are presented and the attack-detection problem is formulated. In Section III, we briefly recall the distributed estimation technique and detection strategy presented in [25] , and its limitations for DC microgrids are higlighted. In Section IV, the monitoring architecture is sketched, unknown input observers are designed to estimate the state of the neighbors, hence a detection threshold is designed and attack detectability is analyzed. In order to validate the proposed technique, in Section V, simulation results are provided showing the effectiveness of the proposed technique.
Notation: In the paper, the operator | · | applied to a set determines its cardinality, while used with matrices or vectors it defines their component-by-component absolute value. The operator · is used to define the matrix norm. In general, in this paper inequalities are considered componentby-component.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Model of the DC Microgrid
Consider a DC microgrid made of N distributed generation units (DGUs), which are modeled as in [4] and are interconnected through power lines. In particular, [4] exploits the Quasi Stationary Line (QSL) approximation where interconnection power lines are supposed to be purely resistive. The entire DC microgrid modeled in this way may be seen as an undirected graph where the nodes represent the DGUs, the edges represent the power lines connecting the DGUs, and the weights of the edges are the resistances of the power lines. The voltage and current dynamics for DGU i are characterised as follows:
where (V ti , I Li ) are inputs to the DGU, (V i , I ti ) are the states, V j ∈ N i are the interconnection terms between the DGUs, and N i ⊂ N ≡ {1, . . . , N } is the set containing neighboring DGUs, i.e. DGUs connected to DGU i through power lines. R ti , C ti , L ti are electrical parameters of the RLC filter of DGU i. R ij is the resistance of the power line connecting DGUs i and j. We now briefly summarize the control methodology in [26] , where a primary controller is designed to stabilize the voltage of the DGUs, and a secondary consensus-based controller is designed to achieve current sharing. The statespace model of DGU i, considering also state disturbances and measurement noise, is given bẏ
, (2) where 
The primary control input is
, where matrix K i is designed following the methodology in [4] . The secondary consensus-based controller input α [i] (t) is defined according to the following consensus protocol:
where I s ti > 0, ∀i ∈ N are scaling factors appropriately defined, and k I is the consensus weight common to all DGUs. The term y c [j,i] (t) represents the output measurement of DGU j which is communicated to DGU i, and is defined in the next subsection. Note that the secondary consensusbased control in [26] requires that there be a communication network connecting the controllers of DGUs. In this paper, without loss of generality, we suppose that the topology of the graph representing the physical interconnections of the DGUs and that of the communication network are the same.
Matrices A ii , B i , M i , A ij , K i , and C i are defined as [3] .
B. Attack Model
We now explain how the attack is modeled. We define the attack as a data injection attack on the communicated data between neighboring DGUs. In the considered scenario, it is assumed that an attacker is able to inject falsified data in the communication network linking neighboring DGUs. We model these attacks by defining the output measurement vector y
where
is the unattacked measurement of state of the i-th DGU, as given in (2), and β(t) is an activation function whose value is 0 for t < 0 and 1 for t ≥ 0. T a [i,j] denotes the time of occurrence of an attack on the communication line connecting node i to j. Note that neighboring DGUs share the full output measurement vector. We suppose that the attack can be active on a subset N i ⊆ N i of the communication lines between DGU i and its neighbors, whilst we assume that, for each DGU, its own measurements of its state are secure.
In the following, for notation simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the attack is concurrent among all the attacked communication lines, i.e. T a [j,i] = T a . The unknown attack function φ i,j (t) is designed by the attacker and models the data which is injected. In the sequel, a detection technique to detect φ i,j (t) is illustrated.
III. DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION OF LOCAL STATE VARIABLES
We design a distributed state estimator -similar to the one given in [25] -based on a full-order Luenberger-like observer and used by each DGU to estimate its local state. This requires local model information, as well as output measurements that are communicated from its neighbors and are subject to possible attacks.
The dynamics of the local state estimator is:
wherex [i] (t),ŷ [i] (t) are the state and output estimates, and In order to determine whether the above distributed estimator allows for attack detection, we analyze the residual
Using (2) and (6) and owing to the definition of C i , for time t < T a , i.e. before the onset of an attack, it is possible to rewrite the residual as
is the state estimation error obeying the following dynamics:
Since A Li are Hurwitz stable for all i ∈ N , the dynamics in (7) are BIBO stable and independent from the primary, secondary, or exogenous inputs. Indeed, Assumption 1 implies the boundedness of [i] (t). More specifically, let us compute the solution of (7):
Because of Assumption 1 and the BIBO stability of (7), it is possible to use the triangle inequality to design a bound
[i] (t) for the estimation error
. The use of the triangle inequality for the design of the bound implies that, in the absence of an attack, the inequality
It is then possible to design an attack-detection threshold as follows:
such that
holds in healthy conditions. Hence it is sufficient that a component of the residual crosses the corresponding threshold to state that an attack is present. A thorough analysis of the detectability properties of this method can be found in [25] .
Limitations on attack detection
In the following we will analyze the limitations of this method when applied to attack-detection for DC microgrids.
Proposition 1: If the attack functions φ j,i (t) in (5) take on the form
where γ j,i (t) and θ j,i (t) are arbitrary functions, then residual (10) is not affected by the attack.
Proof: The proofs of the propositions in this paper are omitted due to space constraints.
Remark 1: Note that undetectable attacks characterized in Proposition 1 turn out to be problematic. As γ j,i (t) in (12) influences the secondary control input in (4), an attacker seeking to alter the consensus-based control input may do so with limited knowledge of the DGU model, and without violating detection test (11) .
Given the above remark, it is necessary to enhance the attack-detection scheme, as defined in the next section.
IV. ESTIMATION OF NEIGHBORING DGU STATES
To overcome the significant issue pointed out in Remark 1, local validation of the transmitted information is necessary. To this end, let us define the structure of the proposed attack detection architecture used for each DGU. We design an unknown input observer for the estimation by DGU i of the state of each of its neighbors. Hence, a bank of |N i | UIOs is designed for detection, one for each of the neighbors of DGU i. Once estimators are defined, bounds on the estimation errors are derived, which lead to the design of |N i | detection thresholds, through which each of the residuals are tested. Following design, detectability is analyzed, and a sufficient condition for an attack to be stealthy is derived.
A. Unknown Input Observers
UIOs allow for state estimation even in the presence of unknown inputs (see, for instance, [24] ). This is a particularly valuable feature in the case of DCmGs, as it allows DGU i to estimate the states of DGUs j, j ∈ N i , without requiring knowledge of their secondary input, exogenous inputs and of the states of their neighbors.
In order to design a UIO, we first recast the dynamics of DGU j in (2) to be consistent with the typical UIO structure [24] . Rewriting system dynamics in (2), one has:
where A Kj = A jj + B j K j , matrixĒ j and vectord [j] (t) contain the inputs to DGU j which are unknown to the UIO in DGU i. Specifically, they are defined as
where {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k |Nj | } are all the elements of N j . Note that for UIO design [24] , it is necessary thatĒ j be full column rank. The full order observer for estimating the state of DGU j in DGU i is:
whereū [j] (t) = 0, ∀t. The filter matrices are designed following [24] as:
Proposition 2: If the UIO filter parameters are designed following (15)- (19) , in the absence of attacks the estimation error [j,i] (t) = x [j] (t) −x [j,i] (t) behaves according to the following dynamics:
In order to design a UIO which converges to the actual value of the state, it is necessary that the system dynamics satisfy the following conditions:
i. rank(C jĒj ) = rank(Ē j ) ; ii. the pair (C j , T j A Kj ) is detectable Then, the following result can be proved. Proposition 3: Given dynamics (13) and matrices defined as in Section II-A, conditions (i) and (ii) hold.
In order to design the UIO it is necessary to define H j such that (15) holds, and K j such that F j in (17) is stable. Then the remaining matrices in (15)- (19) can be derived. Matrix H j satisfies (15) as long as it is in the following form:
in which H j,1 , H j,2 , H j,3 can be arbitrarily assigned. Hence we compute matrices T j , K j ,K j , and K j . Given the structure of T j = I − H j , the term T j A Kj in (17) is 
will be analyzed and a detection threshold will be defined.
B. Detection Thresholds
As in the case for the estimator in Section III, note that the residual in the absence of attacks, i.e. at time t < T a is:
Hence, by designing a bound on error [j,i] , it is possible to exploit the triangle inequality to design a detection threshold. The solution to (20) is:
Using integration by parts, to remove dependence fromρ [j] :
Note that, because F j is Hurwitz stable by design, it is possible to define constants κ, µ > 0 such that
Therefore a time-varying bound [j,i] (t) is designed:
which, for suitably defined¯ [j,i] 
that, in the absence of an attack,
holds. Finally, it is possible to design the detection threshold:
for which in the absence of an attack the following is satisfied
This inequality is then used to detect the presence of attacks. In fact, it is sufficient for it to be violated for at least one component of residual r [j,i] (t) at some time T d for an attack to be detected and the compromised communication link isolated.
C. Detectability Analysis
We now analyze the detectability properties of the proposed method. We start by analyzing the effect of the attack modeled as in (5) on the estimation error dynamics in (20) . In this case [j,i] (t) is given by
where, similarly to (24) we used integration by parts. The residual is r [j,i] 
We would like to find a condition for which at time
is guaranteed to be satisfied for at least one component of the residual.
is fulfilled for at least one component of¯ r [j,i] (t), then attack detection is guaranteed, for any value of ρ [j] (t) and w [j] (t).
D. Stealthy Attacks
We now define a condition on φ j,i (t) causing an attack to be undetectable by the UIO-based detection strategy.
Proposition 5: If the attack is designed in such a way that is satisfied for all t ≥ T a , then its detection by the UIO-based detection scheme is not possible. Attacks satisfying Proposition 5 are part of a class of attacks which are undetectable by the proposed methodology, termed stealthy. Note that, to generate a stealthy attack as in (31) the attacker must have a lot of information regarding the filters of the UIO. The complete characterization of the class of stealthy attacks is out of scope of this preliminary paper, and will be the subject of further research.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed attack detection architecture is evaluated by conducting simulations on MATLAB software. In Figure 1 we present the topology of the considered DC microgrid. The same parameters as in [26] are used in the simulation to define DGU matrices and controllers. In the following, unless otherwise stated, currents are measured in A and volts in V . Process and measurement noises are modeled as random processes verifying Assumption 1, for all t ≥ 0, where:w , and where each scalar process is uncorrelated, and generated from a uniform distribution on the corresponding interval. We consider that, before time t = 1.5s, the DGUs are disconnected. Then, after time T a = 10s, the following attack function affects transmitted measurements y 
(32) Function (32) models an attack on the measurement of the current communicated to compute secondary control of DGU 4, which is equipped with a detector with two UIOs computing estimates of the state of DGUs neighboring DGU 4. The filter matrices for both the unknown-input observers are designed as follows. For j ∈ {2, 3}, the second column of H j in (21) is [0.1, 0.9, 0.1] , matrices T j satisfy (17), K j are such that eigenvalues of F j = {−1, −1.5, −2}, andK j , K j are computed as in (18)- (19) .
In Figure 2 we show the state evolution of V i and I ti for all the DGUs of the DCmG. The scaling factors in (4) are taken to be the current ratings of each DGU, i.e. I s ti = 10A, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and I s t4 = 5A, therefore currents are shown in p.u. Furthermore, this implies that consensus r [2, 4] r [2, 4] r [3, 4] r [3, 4] is achieved when currents are the same in Figure 2 . Note that, with the defined ratings, the attack in (32) corresponds to [0, 0.02, 0] p.u. Together with the state evolution of the systems, in Figure 2 we present the time instance when attack begins, t = T a (black dashed line), as well as the times at which the residuals r [2, 4] (t) and r [3, 4] (t) violate their respective thresholds (in blue and red, respectively). Additionally, in Figure 2 an enlarged portion of the evolution of the current is also shown, to emphasize that consensus is not achieved under attack. Finally, we show the residuals from the UIOs which estimate the neighboring states, in Figure 3 . We see that before time T a , the estimates of the UIOs lie within the bounds, whilst after the onset of the attack, the residuals increase until they cross the threshold, thus detection is achieved at times T d,2 = 10.4s and T d,3 = 11.18s. Note that detection time is also isolation time, at which the detector of DGU 4 is able to identify the communication line over which the information is compromised.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have introduced a distributed attack detection and isolation methodology for DC microgrids. Each DGU locally computes estimates of its neighbors' states through UIOs. In the paper, local detection thresholds are designed, and detectability analysis is performed. Furthermore, a class of stealthy attacks is identified. As future work, we aim to conduct further analysis in the design of the matrices of the UIOs, in order to minimize their effect on the size of the detection threshold. Moreover, we aim to study the possibility of developing a reconfiguration strategy to restore consensus in the event of an attack.
